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to appeal the AO. Therefore, the court precluded Jolly from
challenging the validity of the AO. The court stated Jolly's failure to
exhaust his judicial review opportunities cost him consideration of his
due process claims. Additionally, the preclusion of judicial review
disallowed the court from considering his second issue of whether
there was a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of an underground
drinking water source.
The third issue Jolly raised on appeal was whether the district court
abused its discretion in administering the injunction and civil
penalties. Jolly argued the penalties were excessive in light of his
financial hardship and history of family medical problems. He also
argued the injunction was unwarranted because he did not violate UIC
regulations requiring a response for information. The government
stated the penalties were not an abuse of discretion givenJolly's history
of noncompliance and explicit disregard of the regulations.
Additionally, the government argued Jolly provided insufficient
evidence to support economic hardship. The court examined the
enforcement provisions of the SWDA. The SWDA provides that a
violator of the UIC program may be assessed penalties of up to $25,000
a day. The provisions also state that a failure to reply to a request for
information could result in an injunction. Jolly claimed he never
received the information request. EPA presented evidence that they
attempted to deliver the information. Federal Express returned letters
sent tojolly's and SI's listed addresses as undeliverable. However, EPA
successfully sent a fax to Jolly and received a fax confirmation. The
court therefore presumed Jolly received the request and did not
respond.
The appellate court next examined the factors considered in
assessing a civil penalty for violations of an AO. These factors
included: 1) the seriousness of the violation; 2) the economic benefit
resulting from the violation; 3) history of violations; 4) good faith
efforts to comply; and 5) the economic impact of the penalty on the
violator.
The court affirmed the district court's assessment of
penalties. The court found Jolly's history of bad-faith noncompliance
in excess of seven years, his refusal to accept notices, his avoidance of
liability through the transfer of assets from JAF to SI, and the
seriousness of the violations were well within the discretion of the
lower court's issuance of penalties.
Jon Hyman
NINTH CIRCUIT
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141 (9thCir.
2000) (holding environmental organizations' members showed
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing on the
organizations to survive summary judgment on the standing issue).

Issue2

COURT REPORTS

Ecological Rights Foundation ("ERF") and Mateel Environmental
"environmental
(collectively,
Foundation
("Mateel")
Justice
organizations") sued Pacific Lumber Co. ("Pacific Lumber") pursuant
to the Clean Water Act ("CWA") citizen suit provision for violating its
1992 and 1997 General Permits. The district court granted Pacific
Lumber's summary judgment motion on the ground that the
The
environmental organizations lacked standing to sue.
environmental organizations appealed the standing ruling. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded the
district court's approach to standing was not consistent with Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw, which was decided after the district court
judgment. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found the environmental
organizations had Article III standing.
Pacific Lumber operated two facilities, Yager Camp and the
Carlotta sawmill, in Humboldt County, California. Yager Creek flowed
through Yager Camp, a 150-acre site that included a truck wash
operation, a composting area, and log storage decks. The sawmill,
located downstream of Yager Camp, occupied approximately seventy
acres and included truck shops, an aggregate crusher, and log storage
decks. Yager Creek flowed into the Van Duzen River, which emptied
into the Eel River, which in turn emptied into the Pacific Ocean about
twelve miles from Pacific Lumber's facilities. The facilities were
subject to the CWA and compliance with the 1992 and 1997 General
Permits, which regulated pollutant discharges into California's waters.
Members of ERF and Mateel used Yager Creek for recreation. In
particular, two individuals, Christopher Hinderyckx, a Mateel member,
and Frederic Evenson, an ERF member, used Yager Creek for
recreational activities, such as swimming, snorkeling, and fishing.
However, they alleged possible pollutant discharges from the Pacific
Lumber facilities impaired their enjoyment and continued use of the
creek.
The environmental organizations' standing depended upon
whether Hinderyckx and Evenson could allege an "injury in fact" that
would give them standing in their own individual right. The district
court found the members' contacts with Yager Creek too sporadic and
attenuated. Furthermore, the district court found that none of the
environmental organizations' affiants lived sufficiently near the creek
or regularly used the creek for recreational or aesthetic purposes. The
environmental organizations appealed. On review, the Ninth Circuit
rejected such an inflexible approach based on Laidlaw.
The Ninth Circuit noted that Laidlaw involved a similar citizen suit
under the CWA. In Laidlaw, several environmental organizations
brought suit, alleging violation of a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit at a Laidlaw Environmental Services
("Laidlaw") hazardous waste incinerator on the banks of South
Carolina's North Tyger River. Several of the plaintiff organizations'
members filed declarations detailing the injury they had or would
suffer because of suspected river pollution. While some of the
members lived within two miles of the incinerator, another lived
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twenty miles away. Some members indicated they had used the river
for recreational purposes, while Laidlaw's alleged pollutant discharge
deterred others from such activities. The United States Supreme
Court held these individuals had stated injuries to their aesthetic and
recreational interests sufficiently specific enough to allow standing.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, under Laidlaw,
individuals could establish "injury in fact" by showing that their
aesthetic or recreational enjoyment would suffer if the area became
environmentally degraded, without demonstrating that they live within
some geographical proximity. The Ninth Circuit stated this flexible
approach was the only approach consistent with the nature of the
aesthetic and recreational interests that typically provided the basis for
standing in environmental cases.
In response, Pacific Lumber alternatively argued that the
environmental
organizations lacked standing
because they
demonstrated neither actual environmental harm to Yager Creek nor
the company caused any such harm. However, the Ninth Circuit
declared that the district court correctly recognized the threshold
question concerning citizen standing under the CWA, which was
whether an individual could show she had been injured due to
concerns about environmental law violations, not whether she could
show that actual environmental harm existed. The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that a CWA citizen suit did not need to prove harm
because any violation, even those that were purely procedural, was
subject to suit.
Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate actual
environmental harm in order to obtain standing would compel a
plaintiff to prove more to show standing than she would have to prove
to succeed on the merits.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held the
environmental organizations had standing to sue.
John A. Helfch
Natural Res. Def. Council v. S.W. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding (1) Natural Resources Defense Council had standing
and gave proper notice to Southwest Marine pursuant to the Clean
Water Act; (2) Southwest Marine committed continuing violations;
and (3) proper remedies against Southwest Marine included an
injunction and civil penalties).
Southwest Marine operated a shipyard on San Diego Bay. In order
to repaint ships, Southwest Marine first blasted off the old paint with
copper particles.
Then they repainted the ships with a paint
containing compounds toxic to aquatic marine life. Southwest Marine
then discharged the waste from the repainting procedure into
adjacent water. Studies of the adjacent water indicated it contained a
high level of the same materials found in the waste. Southwest Marine
held permits for pollutant discharge and storm water runoff from

